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POLARIZED AND UNPOLARIZED LEGAL RELA-
TIONS
ALBET KOcOuRzK
Northwestern University School of Law
In another article' the present writer undertook to state the
precise and essential difference between relations "in rem" and
relations "in personam." The latter terms have been universally
criticised 2 and they are always confusing especially to beginning
law students when taken in connection with actions "in rem" and
actions "in personam." In a juristic sense, relations exist only be-
tween persons. There can not, therefore, be a legal relation be-
tween a person and a thing3, nor can there be a legal relation be-
tween things.
In the article to which reference has been made, a so-called right
"in rem" was defined as "one of which the essential investitive facts
do not serve directly to identify the person. who owes the incident
duty." Direct identification by the investitive fact by which the
right is created, being taken as the basis of definition, a right "in
personam" was defined as one of which "the essential investitive
facts serve directly to identify the person who owes the -incident
duty." Since the terms "in rem" and "in personam" are unsatis-
faclory, we shal now substitute for 'them in this discussion, the
equivalent terms polarized (for relations "in personam") and un-
polarized (for relations "in rem").
1"R!ghts In Rem," in Penn. L. Rev. LXWIII. 322.
2 Cf. Salmond, "Jur." (3 ed. 81 p. 205 sq.); .Hohfeld, "Fundamental Legal Concep-
tions," Yale L. Jour. XXVI, 710 sq.; Holland, "Jur." (11ed. 143); Markby "Elements
of Law" (6 ed. 165); Terry "Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law" 12; Ham-
mond, Introd. Sandars' Institutes of Justinian (Am. ed.) pp. Xli sq.; Schuster,
"Leading Principles of Ger. Civ. Law." p. 67; Lindley "Study of Jur.," p. 67;
Amos, "Science of Law," p. 95; Pound, "Introd. to Study of Law" (1912), p. 25;
Vinogradoff, "Common Sense in Law," p. 67
2 In continental juristic works, some writers define legal relation to include
relations of persons to things (e. g., Ilnneccerus Kipp Wolff, "Lehrb. d. burgerl.
Rechts" I, 1, 155.) Stammler Justly criticizes this usage ("Wirtschaft u.
Recht, p. 658.)
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Every legal relation, whether of claim, immunity, privilege, or
power, involves two persons. It also involves an advantage and a
disadvantage; thus, A has a claim (advantage) of corporal integrity
and X owes a duty (disadvantage) of negative acts toward A, the
effect of which is to isolate the interest of A in his physical well-be-
ing and thus to leave it unimpaired as against conduct of X. Broadly,
the two persons involved in the relation and the correlative sides,
consisting of advantage and disadvantage, may be embraced by the
term "polarity." Every legal relation in this sense has "polarity."
It involves two persons (it is dyadic) and two aspects of conduct
(it is dypolic).
A learned writer, Arthur L. Corbin, Professor of Law in Yale
University, has criticized the analysis above summarized and has
defended the terms "multital" (used for a relation "in rem") and
"paucital" (used for a relation "in personam").
Professor Corbin says4 :
" . . Hohfeld had suggested that 'A multital right, or claim (right
in rem) is always one of a large class of fundamentally similar yet separate
rights actual and potential, residing in a single person (or single group of
persons) but availing respectively against persons constituting a very large
and indefinite class of people." (Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 1917, Yale
Law Journal XXVI, 710, 718.) " . . . Kocourek criticized the definition
as 'insufficient' and supposed the case where 'A, a landowner, has granted
an easement to every person in the state [and out of the state too] to walk
across his land except to B.' A's right that B shall not enter has now .be-
come a 'unital' right, although formerly it was one of many 'multital'
[rights]. He [Kocourek] adds, 'Yet, there can be no doubt that this right
is only a right in rem.' But there is doubt, because -it depends solely upon
one's chosen definition. If 'multital'-ness is the definitional attribute of
right in rem, then this right against B, having lost this attribute, has become
[a right] in personam.
"Professor Kocourek's definition seems to possess the very same weak-
ness that he asserts against Hohfeld's definition, i. e., we can find at least
one case where it does not work. Suppose that the investittive facts are
such that we know that the duties correlative to A's rights in rem are
absolutely universal. Are not the persons bearing the duties directly iden-
tified by these investitive facts? .
"The fact is that there is no substantial difference between a righti in
rem in A against B and a right in personam in A aganst B. . ..
There are two very striking features in Professor Corbin's ex-
planation: (1) That a right in rem can be transformed into a right
in personam, without any new jural fact which afficts the integrity
4
"Jural Relations and Their Classification,." Yale Law Journal, = 226(232 n. 4.)
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of the right in question; (2) that there is no substantial difference
between a right in rem and a right in personam5 .
Legal relations may be defined and classified from two stand-
points: (1) According to their interval, substantial qualities; and
(2) according to their external, accidental connection with other
legal relations. At the threshold, it seems to us that Professor
Corbin has confused these different points of attack, beginning with
an effort to define aegal relations according to their internal qual-
ities and ending with a definition based on accidental, exterial can-
tacts. The net result is that Professor Corbin has started to justify
new words for old concepts and by the* difficulties encountered in
application of his terminology has unconsciously been catapulted
into an alien cross-division where the old concepts are obliterated.
It is understandable that by this method of analysis, Professor
Corbin couid assert the revolutionary doctrine that there is no sub-
stantial difference between a right "in rem" and a right "in per-
sonam." But that view is not tenable on that ground or on any other.
The ideas which underlie relations in rem (unpolarized rela-
tions) and relations in personam (polarized relations) constitute
one of the most pervasive, fundamental, and utilitarian categories
of legal science. Without them we should be in the paleolithic age
of jurisprudence. Hobfeld no doubt recognized the great juristic
value of these concepts, for after his elaboration of the kinds of legal
relations (claim, power, etc.6 ) he first began in his attempt (inter-
rupted by death) at further classification, with rights in rem. Con-
viction of the juristic importance of keeping intact the basal ideas
of the categoiies under discussion must be our excuse for agiin
taking up the cudgels.
It may be admitted that "multital"-ness is the normal external
accompaniment of an unpolarized relation. It is insisted only that
"multital"-ness is not an essental, internal quality of an unpolarized
relation, since we have already shown that an unpolarized relation
may exist in a unitary (dyadic) reLation; i. e., in the case where a
'A similar view, though based on other grounds, has been expressed by a
German jurist (Neuner, "Wesen u. Arten d. Privatrechtsverhaltnisse," pp. 15, 40),
but It has no following.
'Legal relations may be classified into a hierarchy of classes, orders, famil-
le, genera, and species. This has been done partially by Holland and by Sal-
mond, but it cannot be fully accomplished until the categories are more fully
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landowner has given an easement to cross his land to all persons but
one (who may be known to him or not). The case put is one of
progressive cutting down of the incidence of the relation, but a case
may also be put where a relation in rem at the time of origin is
not "multital." Thus, let it be supposed that every taxpayer and
every member of his family has by law the privilege of crossing
any open -field, but that others may not. Let it be supposed that
there is only one person who does not come within the privilege.
That isolated individual may be known to the owner of the land or
be unknown to him. It is immaterial. Here, also, therefore, is an
instance of a right "in rem" against a single person.
The internal character of an unpolarized relation does not
change by reason of external jural facts. Once polarized, always
polarized. Once unpolarized, always unpolarized. We may admit,
also, that the terms "multital" and "paucital" may stand as de-
scriptive terms, if it" seems desirable to any one to use them, but
only on the clear concession that these terms are not substitateg for
rdlations "in rem" and relations "in personam," and on the further
concession that they are loose-jointed cross-divisions; for how many
is "multital" and how few is "paucital?" Do these terms depend
on individual psychic temperament, or are they related to the census
tables of a particular state? For an individual given to gross ex-
aggeration, "paucital" is always "multital;" for one reserved and
cautious in his utterances, "multital" is likely to be "paucital."
In a populous country like China with its four hundred millions of
inhabitants, for a disciple of Mencius, a legal relation will need
much incidence before it becomes multital; while in San Marino a
tenancy in common as between cotenants may be regarded as a com-
plex of multital relations.
The illustration put by Professor Corbin, by way of a "coup de
la mort," of an unpolarized relation of universal incidence as amount-
ing to identification, seems to us to embody an apparent kind of
fallacy. Let us put it this way: Suppose a biologist has isolated
under his microscope one of the animalcula known as "rotifer
7 The question Is entirely one of convenience and on that ground it is prefer-
able to regard polarization as creating a new. legal relation. For example, when
a battery is committed, the new relation Is polarized (i. e. duty to pay dam-
ages) but the unpolarized relation remains intact.
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vulgaris;" has he identified all the animal, vegetable, mineral, and
other kingdoms, because of their universality of incidence? Clearly
not, if identification means anything. There may be relations of
universal incidence of disadvantage (duty or liability) but do we
know anything else than that a class is pointed out? Does the in-
vestitive fact go far enough to point out directly even a class? We
think Professor Corbin himself would be one of the first (by the good
title of his own contribution to the point that legal relations are
always relations of "two persons, neitker more nor lesss) to insist
that there can be no legal relation between one person and a class
of persons. Suppose, even, where an unpolarized relation exists,
that the name and personal character of each one of all the other
persons in the world is known to the dominus of the relation before
and after the relation comes into existence (e. g., where A becomes
an owner of land)-does the investitive fact of his ownership (i. e.,
his power to accept an offer of grant) directly, i. e., in and of itself,
point out these persons,
If we ignore the plain distinction between the meaning of the
words "direct" and "indirect" we necessarily get into other difficul-
ties. Suppose that A when exercising his power of acceptance of an
offer of grant, knows the names and faces of twenty thousand persons,
as we have heard a successful politician boast, would not the twenty
thousand and one persons (we include the grantor) be more directly
identified than the remainder of the men, women, and children of
the orbis terrarum?
A more crucial case can be put: Suppose that A becomes an
owner of half of a tract of land under a grant from B who remains
owner of the other half. A has a claim to lateral support of his
land. Did A's power to accept an offer of a grant of a specific half
of a given tract of land directly point out B as lying under a duty
not to dig on the half of the tract not conveyed so near the border
as to cause A's aand to fall into a pit? It seems to us that the an-
swer is clearly that it did not. The investitive fact standing alone
does not inform us whether B is the owner of the remaining half
of the tract or not. The persons who owe the incident duties of nob
infringing the claim of lateral support are unpolarized-they in-
8
"Legal A nalysis and Terminology," Yale L. Jour., XXIX, 365.
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elude owners, tenants, licensees, and even trespassers of the other
half of the land9 . It would be otherwise if the grant from B to A
was of an undivided half of a tract of land, so far as concerns the
duties of cotenants between themseives.
Suppose, again, that A says to B: "I will pay you $100 if you
will promise to deliver to me the sorrel mare known as V," and B
says: "I accept." In the various relations which may arise of this
bargain, the investitive fact always directly identifies the person
(bfiyer or seller) who owes the incident duty.
There is no difficulty about the matter if we do not inject into
the problem unnecessary complications. Certain relations are polar-
ized and the others are unpolarized. What is the explanation of this
DThe act of exercising a power to accept an offer of grant does not polarize
the grantor. The juristic situation may be shown in the following diagram:(where M1-mesonomic relation; Z=zeugmanomic relation; right arrows are
powers; left arrow is claim; bracketed arrows-relatlon; plus arrows.--positive
acts; minus arrow=negative act (I. e., to refrain from trespass); unbracketed
arrows=acts; -% =involution (resulting in); 1V- =evolution of the
proximate prevenient relation; A and B"=grantor and grantee; Xlndeterminate
person): (1) (2) (.)
offer -
M (A-> B) V-A -B P l( A(4) (5)
Acceptance
B ->A -
The Jural act of acceptance (No. 4) is like a usucaption. Historically livery
of seisin was the ceremonial to make evident that the grantee took the land,
i. e., the possession ('Black. Com. II, 310; Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law,
II, 29-0) and so basic and fundamental, historically and juristically, Is this
view of the nature of possession that until 1845 In England In legal theory
(as modified, however, by the statute of uses) no deed of conveyance was effec-
tive until the grantee took possession (8, 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 2). The relation (No.
3) out of which the acceptance (No. 4) is evolved, Is polarized; i. e., the (now)
grantee has a power to accept, and the (now) gTantor is under a liability' that
his offer (No. 2) may result in legal consequences: i. e., that he may lose the
land to the grantee; but the fact remains that the act of acceptance (No. 4)
does not in and of itself polarize the offerer any more than any other person
in the world. The case is no different than if A, an owner of a chattel, abandons
it, whereupon he (A) or any other person has the power of taking it. The act
of acceptance, therefore, does not polarize a legal relation but results in an
unpolarized relation. (No. 5.) In analyzing this situation, we have used the con-
ventional terms, "offer" and "acceptance," but they are not to be understood here
In the contract sense. Strictly the offer is to abandon the land in favor of the
grantee. The acceptance is not. as in contract, of an offer, but of the land
itself. What the grantee wants is not the grantor's offer (apart from covenants
of title) but the land itself.
But, on the other hand, suppose that A commits a battery on B. Here the
act of A (or. at any rate, its immediate consequences) polarizes B. In the
case of seisin, the act is directed against a res (land) while in the battery, the
act Is directed against a person.
It is interesting to observe that Polarization may come either from the
dominus or the servus of the postvenient relation. Another Illustration will
show this in a striking way: Suppose A, B, and C are born in the order stated
and let us take for our example B's claim to corporal integrity. As against A,
the investitive facts of B's claim are essentially the existence of A plus the
birth of B. As against C, the investitive facts of B's claim are essentially the
existence (birth) of B plus the birth of C. 'hile, for the existence of any jural
relation, a complex of jural facts are necessary to be taken into account, yet for
the purpose of determining the nature of a legal relation as polarized or un-
polarized, it seems more accurate to limit the determinative element to the
proximate jural fact (act or event) which creates the relation.
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juristic phenomenon? Is it not simply this: that in unpolarized re-
lations there is izo practical need of identification, while in polarized
relations we must know the polarity (i. e., the persons, the advantage,
and the disadvantage) in order to deal with it in an intelligent and in
a utilitarian way? If A has a claim (right) to reputation, is there
any practical neeessity of knowing the personality of a million per-
sons who each one has the power to utter a defamatory statement?
There might be some practical utility in A's keeping a list of his
enemies and cataloging the names of those likely to commit certain
kinds of torts against him, but this procedure is entirely too prac-
tical for the law since it will not ordinarily entertain any presump-
tion of future wrong-doing as to any person, whether friend or
enemy'0 . Suppose, again, a "multital" dependent relation where the
servus is identified but where the domini are unidentified; as, for
example, when A: engages in the business of common carrier, by
reason of which fact he immediately comes under a multiplicity of
duties to receive and carry goods which are offered to him for that
purpose. In this case, we have not, as before, instant negative acts
to deal with, but conditional positive acts; the condition being that
one of these unidentified persons shall step out of his refuge of legal
anonymity and make a legal tender of goods for -transportation. There
is no practical legal need of knowing who these various persons are
until the moment when they tender goods for transportation. At that
moment polarized legal relations come into existence. Since it ap-
pears that either the domini or the servi of plurinary relations may
be unidentified by the investitive fact or facts which create them,
we may speak of convergent unpolarized relations (in the dominus)
and of divergent (from the servus) unpolarized relations'1 .
Inasmuch as practical necessity and .utility are the base of the
distinction, it will be found as a corrollary that in all independent
unpolarized relations the content of the relations (acts) is negative
and that in nearly all polarized relations, whether dependent or in-
dependent, the content of these relations (acts) is positive. One ex-
ception is to be noted and accounted for. If A has agreed with B
10 Mr. Terry In his analysis of rights seems to have gone this far: "Leading
Principles of Anglo-American Law," 119.
11 Thus, when there is a claim (right) of reputation in A, a multiplicity of
legal duties converge toward A. Where A is an inkeeper, a multiplicity of con-
ditional duties diverge from A in favor of indeterminate persons.
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not to compete with him in business, the act required is a negative
act (i. e., not to compete). The relation is polarized, but the prac-
tical significance and utility of identifying A as the person who
owes the negative duty, aies in the fact that he is the only person in
the world who is prevented, because of his contract, from engaging
in otherwise lawful acts of commercial rivalry.
In conclusion we believe we may assert with some confidence:
(1) That the original distinction of relations "in rem" and "in
personam" is of considerable juristic importance; (2) that the terms
"multital" and "paucital" are not synonymous with, but are
cross-divisions of, "in rem" and "in personam;" and (3) that the
essence of "in personam" and "in rem" rests on the test of identi-
fication and that the old terms are best expressed by the substitutes
here proposed, polarized and unpolarized relations12.
"2We use the term "relations" because all the orders of legal relation, viz.:
claims, immunities, privileges, and powers, may be polarized or unpolarized.
The writer may be permitted to say that the terms "polarized" and "unpolar-ized" have been !elected 1rom a list containing more than a score of other com-
binations made up of English, Greek, and Latin words. Thd most persuasive
combination next to the oaw definitely appropriaLed was "poliscopie" and "apell-
scopic." The terms to which preference has been given have the advantage of
being well understood and they embrace a dynamic connotation which we be-
lieve accurately describes the legal phenomena which account for the striking
differences in the relations under discussion.
